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Abstract
A number of countries are considering, mainly as part of their obliga-
tions under current treaties, domestic action internalizing the social
cost of pollution. One of the major obstacles, however, in those coun-
tries is the fear of jeopardizing their competitive position in world
markets. A policy that has been repeatedly proposed to deal with
this challenge is a tariff that mitigate any distortions arising from
cross-country differences in environmental policy. Such unilateral ac-
tions are the focus of this paper. It is argued that if a country set its
pollution taxes optimally, cooperatively or non-cooperatively, there
exist unilateral tariff reforms that improve global welfare.
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1 Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) predicts that under
“business as usual” the global mean temperature over the next century will
increase by 3.7oC to 4.8oC compared to pre-industrial levels. The potential
(both physical and economic) consequences of such considerable increase in
the level of temperature are likely to be catastrophic (Stern (2006) and Jones
et al. (2012)). It is reckoned that to reduce the adverse impact of dangerous
levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases concentration, it would be required,
collectively, to slow and then cut global GHG emissions by a substantial 40-70
percent by 2050, compared to 2010 and emissions levels near zero GtCO2eq
or below in 2011 (IPCC 2014).1 This along with the asymmetric impact of
climate change and the unboundary nature of emissions reveals the need for
international cooperation.2 But such cooperation is not easy to be achieved
as in the case of Kyoto and the Copenhagen Protocol.
In response to this challenge, a number of countries are considering, mainly
as part of their obligations under current treaties, domestic action to address
climate change. One of the major obstacles, however, in those countries
towards taking such action, is the concern that it may put their domestic
industries at a disadvantage relative to producers in countries that do not
take similar actions. At the heart of this issue lies a classic-free rider problem.
Since the reduction of greenhouse gases is a global public good and so each
country would prefer the others to cut emissions thereby avoiding bearing
the cost.
A unilateral policy action that has been repeatedly proposed to deal with
this challenge could include a provision that forces goods that enter the home
market to internalize the cost of pollution. A measure that does this is a tariff
on imported goods that levels the playing field between domestic producers
that face costly climate measures and foreign producers that face very few.
Such tariff would put a charge (in the form of a carbon tax) on imported
1For recent—and insightful—surveys on the issue see Chen and Woodland (2013) and
Jones et al. (2013).
2Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) research the interaction between environmental and
trade policies from a cooperative perspective and the characterization of each policy as a
Pareto efficient instrument. Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004) argue that multilateral
agreements on international trade and environmental policy could be welfare improving.
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goods equivalent to what these goods would have had to be charged if they
had been produced domestically. In the case of exported goods the scheme
rebates any payment of carbon taxes to exporters. By doing this it preserves
mitigation of emissions without affecting the international competitiveness of
carbon-intensive sectors thereby mitigating carbon leakage incentives (that
is, mitigating the incentive of carbon-intensive sectors to relocate production
to countries with low environmental standards). A type of this trade measure
is the border-tax-adjustments (BTAs).3
The issue of unilateral governments actions has not been neglected from the
trade and environmental literature. The main body of this literature focuses
on the identification of the first and second best optimal policy level of uni-
lateral policy instruments, less attention has been paid on reforms of policy
instruments and their effect on welfare.4 The first and second best optimal
is key issue in the analysis of Markusen (1975), Baumol and Oates (1988),
Krutilla (1991) Hoel (1996), Copeland (1996) for open economics and in the
presence of pollution externalities. Within this context they identify the op-
timal level of policy instruments when environmental and trade policy are
available focusing, as well in the case of only one policy tool being available
with the other one being distorted away from its optimal level. Less atten-
tion has being paid on unilateral policy reforms. Copeland (1994), considers
such reforms for environmental and trade policy instruments in the context
of small open economy, establishing the existence of unilateral reforms that
deliver potential Pareto improvement. In particular, it is argued that reforms
of pollution and trade taxes and quotas, in proportion to their deviation from
their optimal level, are welfare improving. In a similar context Neary (2005)
identifies the first and second best optimal level of emissions binding stan-
dards, emission taxes and trade tariffs. He also examines the welfare effects
of unilateral reforms of the available policy instruments. Hatzipanayotou et
al (2008), within a model of two small open economies with two goods and
cross-border pollution, identify the effect of cross-border pollution and terms
3For an analysis on BTAs (as Pareto efficient devices) see Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014).
4As it is known form the literature on distortions (e.g. Bhagwati 1971), first best policy
requires at least two instruments e.g. trade taxes and emission taxes. Each instrument
directly affects its corresponding economic sector (trade taxes affect trade flows, emis-
sion taxes affect emissions). However each instrument indirectly affects the other sectors.
While in the second best optimal case, at least one of the available policy instrument
is constrained away from its optimal level, the remaining ones must take account of all
economic activities.
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of trade changes on Nash emission taxes, emission levels and welfare arguing
that under certain circumstances they can be welfare increasing.
Although the characterization of tariffs (BTAs) as a Pareto efficient instru-
ment is well understood,5 it is not entirely clear whether, starting from a
distorting initial equilibrium (in emission levels), there exist tariff reforms
undertaken unilaterally by a country that increases global welfare. And this
is the objective of this paper. It will be shown that there exists a reform—
and one that changes tariffs equi-proportionately—that maximize aggregate
welfare. Such reform are commonly used in the international trade and envi-
ronment conflict literature as in Baumol and Oates (1988), Copeland (1994)
and Neary (2005). This paper deviates from these researches as it allows for
transboundary pollution externalities and captures also the foreign country’s
responses to home country’s fiscal policy distortions. Also by focusing on
small open economies we are able to focus clearly, compared to the case of
large open economies, on the effects of trade distortions on environmental
quality. Interestingly the source of inefficiency of the pollution distortion
is coming only through the home country’s production which consequently
affect foreign country’s utility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 discuss the existence of welfare increasing tariff reforms in the pres-
ence of optimal non-cooperative pollution taxes. Section 4 introduce welfare
increasing tariff reforms in the presence of optimal cooperative pollution taxes
while Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses their policy relevance.
2 Description of the model
The framework is a standard model of international trade with two countries
labeled “home” and “foreign”. Home and foreign country’s variables are
indexed by lower-and upper-case letters, respectively. The economy is a
perfectly competitive with home country being a small open one, thus it can
not affect international prices, w.6
5see among others Markusen (1975), Baumol and Oates (1988), Krutilla (1991) Hoel
(1996), Copeland (1996), Neary (2005), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) Tsakiris et al (2014)
6The current framework does not impose any restrictions on the size of the foreign
country.
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In each country there are N tradeable commodities. The first traded com-
modity is used as the numeraire good, with its home and foreign prices being
normalized to unity. Throughout the analysis it will be assumed that the
numeraire good is untaxed. Pollution is modeled as a by-product of produc-
tion in the sense that production generates some pollutant, denoted by the
N -vector z, for the home, and Z for the foreign country. Total emissions in
the home (foreign) country denoted by k(K) are given by i′z (i′Z), where i
is the N -vector of 1s (and a prime denotes transposition).
Pollution is transboundary and given by7
k = K = i′z + i′Z . (1)
In each country there is a representative consumer with preferences rep-
resented by the expenditure function e(u, k, p) (E(U,K, P )) that gives the
minimum expenditure required to achieve utility u¯ (U¯) given pollution k (K)
and prices p (P ) respectively for each country.
e(p, u, k) = min
x
{p′x : u (x, k) ≥ u¯} (2)
E(P,U,K) = min
x
{
P ′X : U (X,K) ≥ U¯} ,
with, as an envelope property, ep (Ep) being the vector of compensated de-
mands and ek (EK) the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for pollution
reduction in terms of the private good. Notice, for later use that, ek > 0
(EK > 0) since pollution is a “public bad”; a unit of extra consumption of
pollution requires by the consumer a positive compensation in terms of the
private good.
Home country imposes sector-specific pollution taxes, given by the N -vector
s. All collected revenues
are returned to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion.
The private sector in the home country is perfectly competitive and charac-
terized by the revenue function
r(p, s, v) = max
y,z
{p′y − s′z : (y, z) ∈ τ(v)} , (3)
7Notice that one can also introduce (the degree of) externalities across countries. This,
however, would add no additional insights.
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where τ(v) is the home country’s technology set, v is the vector of endow-
ments, and y denotes the (net) output of tradeable goods. The revenue
function in (3) gives the maximum revenues generated for given prices p and
pollution taxes s.It has the standard properties: It is a convex function, ho-
mogeneous of degree one in p and s and (assumed to be) twice continuously
differentiable.8 Given the properties of the revenue function, the matrices
rpp and rss are both positive semi-definite matrices.
9
Hotelling’s lemma implies that, the output vector is given by
y = rp (p, s) , (4)
whereas the vector of emissions (associated with the production of the N
tradeable goods) is given—as an envelope property from (3)—by
z = −rs (p, s) . (5)
Production in the foreign country is described by
R(P, S, V ) = max
Y,Z
{P ′Y − S ′Z : (Y, Z) ∈ T (V )} . (6)
Following (6), as an envelope property, the output and the emissions vector
defined, respectively, by
Y = Rp (P, S) ; Z = −Rs(P, S) , (7)
where P is the foreign country’s price vector of the tradeable goods.
The home country uses trade taxes (or subsidies if they are exported)—
denoted by the N -vector t— on the tradeable goods with any revenues being
returned to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion.
Given the vector of pollution taxes and tariffs, the equilibrium for this econ-
omy, assuming it exists, is characterized by
e (u, k, p) = r (p, s) + t′ (ep (u, k, p)− rp (p, s)) + s′z , (8)
E(U,K, P ) = R(P, S) + SZ, (9)
p = P + t , (10)
P = w , (11)
k = K = i′z + i′Z = −i′rs(p, s)− i′Rs (P, S) . (12)
8Notice that implicit in (3) is that the private sector can abate environmental discharges
by altering production patterns.
9The endowment vectors, being fixed, are being suppressed from what follows.
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Equations (8) and (9) represent, respectively, the budget constraint of the
consumer of the home and the foreign country, respectively: It simply says
that (for the home country) expenditures given by e (u, k, p) are equal to
GDP, given by r(p, s), plus the pollution-tax and the tariffs revenues, given
by s′z and t′ (ep (u, k, p)− rp (p, s)). Similarly for the foreign country—in the
absence of trade taxes— expenditures E(U,K, P ) are equal to GDP R(P, 0)
plus the pollution tax revenues. Equation (10) stands for the home country’s
prices which are equal to foreign country’s goods prices plus the imposed
tariffs on imported goods. Finally, equation (11) is the foreign country’s
goods prices which are equal to international ones.
Perturbing equation (12), after making use of the fact that—following10 dw =
0—dp = dt one obtains11
dk = dK = −i′rspdt− i′rssds . (13)
Perturbing now equation (8)—after making use of (4), (13) and the fact that
dp = dt and also dP = 0—one obtains
eu(1−t′m)du = [(eki′ − t′epki′ − s′) rsp − t′λ] dt+[(eki′ − t′epki′ − s′) rss − t′rps] ds ,
(14)
where 1 − t′m > 0, with m = epu/eu > 0, and λ = rpp − epp is a positive
semi-definite matrix of home excess compensated supplies.12
Equation (14) shows, clearly, that home country welfare depends on a number
of distortions In particular:
 The term eki
′− t′epki′− s′ gives the deviation of the marginal damage,
in the home country, from the pollution-tax vector s. With trade taxes,
10Recall that this is small open economy.
11Equation (13) shows the limitation of fixed international prices w. If international
prices could be affected by home country’s tariffs and pollution taxes, the home country
would be able to affect foreign production directly via international prices w, since they are
functions of domestic instruments. To see this notice that, following (6), dK = −i′RSP dw.
Any change in s or t would affect w and so, in turn, K.
12eu (1− t′m) gives the change in the real income, deflated by the tariff multiplier, Neary
(2006). The fact that 1 − t′m > 0 relates to the stability of the equilibrium (and to the
Hatta normality condition).
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an increase in pollution affects consumers through two effects: A direct
one, given by eki
′, and an indirect one, given by t′epki′, through the
trade distortions and so via a change in the compensated demands. If
the compensated demands fall because of an increase in pollution, and
so epk < 0, then the trade distortion is exacerbated by the pollution.
 The term t′λ which gives the effect of changes in the import demand
as a consequence of the change in tariffs.
Similarly, pollution taxes have a number of effects on welfare.
 The term eki
′ gives the direct effect (a reduction of pollution which
represent a welfare gain) of the tax on pollution.
 The term t′epki′ gives the indirect effect through the trade distortion.
 The term t′rps gives the effect of pollution taxes on welfare through
tax revenues (since imports changes as a consequence of changes in the
policy instrument).
3 Tariff reforms in the presence of non-cooperative
environmental policy
The balance of the effects described above define, according to equation (14),
the optimal policies of the home country.13 Clearly, and in the absence of
tariffs, the preceding discussion suggests that home country will set pollution
taxes, at the optimum level eki = s. Indeed this is the case. To see this set
t = 0 and dt = 0 in (14) to obtain
eudu = (eki
′ − s′) rssds , (15)
13With each policy instrument directly affecting its corresponding economic sector (tar-
iffs affect trade flows whereas pollution taxes affect emissions), it is intuitive that the first
best optimal policy requires the use of two policy instruments; tariffs targeting trade flows
and pollution taxes targeting the externality directly. Under second best optimal policy
either there is only one policy instrument available or there are two but one has been set
at inefficient levels. For contributions see, among others, Markusen (1975), Krutila (1991),
Hoel (1996), Neary (2006), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014).
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and so optimality, from the home country’s perspective, dictates that the op-
timal pollution tax is given by—given that rss is (assumed to be) invertible—
s = eki.
Optimal second best environmental policy for the home country dictates that
it sets pollution taxes equal to the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay
for pollution reduction.
The fact that home country sets s = eki is intuitive: Since the home coun-
try cannot affect international prices and, therefore, pollution in the foreign
country it sets the marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in pollution
at home ek equal to the pollution-tax s.
14
The analysis turns next to the search for Pareto improving tariff reforms
when home country set its pollution taxes at their optimum level.
Suppose now that the home country imposes pollution taxes optimally fol-
lowing (15) and the foreign country’s pollution taxes S are fixed at arbitrary
levels. Then, the question is, can we find tariff-reforms that improve global
welfare?15 This is to what we now turn.
Perturbing (9), for fixed pollution tax vector s and S, with dw = 0 and using
equation (13), one obtains
EUdU = EKi
′rspdt . (16)
As can be seen from (16) foreign welfare is affected by the home country’s
tariffs but, interestingly, not because tariffs have a price effect on foreign
14One, of course, might ask whether, starting from an initial situation in which ek 6= s,
a pollution tax reform that increases utility in the home country can be implemented.
The answer to this is in the affirmative. Consider, for instance, the reform that changes
s equiproportionally to its difference from the marginal external damage of pollution that
is, ds = (ek − s) da where a is a scalar and da > 0. In this case (15) reduces to
eu (1− t′m) du = (ek − s)′ rss (ek − s) da > 0
where the inequality sign following from the fact that rss is a positive semi-definite matrix.
This reconfirm the result in Copeland (1994), p.51.
15The home country undertakes a global perspective as its actions aim to tackle pollution
and not rent seeking as in Copeland (1996). Also a tariff reform that is aggregate welfare
increasing will be easier to be justified under the WTO principles.
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demand but simply because they affect production at home and so pollution
in the foreign country (the term i′rsp).16 What (16) also shows is the possi-
bility that the foreign country might benefit from a tariff reform in the home
country.17
Aggregate welfare, following from (14) and (16) with pollution taxes set to
optimum, is given by
δdu+ ∆dU = [(Eki
′ − t′epki′) rsp − t′λ] dt , (17)
where δ ≡ eu (1− t′m) and ∆ ≡ EU . It is now easy to see that the optimal
tariff that maximizes global welfare is given by
t′ (s) = (Eki′ − t′epki′) rspλ−1 , (18)
where t (s) denotes the dependence of the optimal tariff on pollution distor-
tions. What (18) emphasizes is that it is not only distortions via trade (in the
sense of changes in the home country’s compensated demands, epki
′rspλ−1)
that the optimal tariff should account for, but also the foreign country pollu-
tion distortions (Eki
′rspλ−1), that affect foreign (and so global) utility. Notice
that if rsp = 0, then the optimal tariff, from a world welfare perspective, is
zero: The point here being that tariffs cannot affect production decisions at
home and, therefore, should not be used; free trade is optimal.
The question that now arises is to what extend one can construct a tariff
reform that raise global welfare. This is to what we now turn. To answer
this it will help re-writing—using (18)—aggregate welfare in (17) as
δdu+ ∆dU = [t (s)− t]′ λdt . (19)
Consider now the scenario of moving tariffs towards their Pareto efficient
level in the sense that
dt = [t(s)− t] da , (20)
16Notice that—as alluded to earlier—if the home country’s emissions do not respond to
prices, and so rsp = 0, then the home country’s tariffs will not affect foreign welfare.
17This will be, for instance, the case if tariffs change according to dt = Eki
′da where a
is a scalar. In this case (16) reduces to EUdU = Eki
′rspEki′da. The welfare sign of this
depends on the structure of the matrix rsp, which cannot be signed without additional
assumptions on the structure of technology (see Copeland (1994)), and on the direction
of da. All the reform requires is that da taken the same sign of rsp.
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with da > 0. Substituting (20) into (19) we have that
δdu+ ∆dU = [t (s)− t]′ λ [t(s)− t] da ≥ 0 , (21)
where the inequality follows from the fact that λ is a positive semi-definite
matrix (and da > 0). This simple says that if the optimal tariff that max-
imizes global welfare t(s) is above the existing one t it should be increased.
If on the other hand t (s) < t then it should be reduced. To emphasize:
Proposition 1 Starting from any arbitrary tariff distorted equilibrium, with
t 6= t (s), and initial pollution taxes set at their second best optimal non-
cooperative level s = eki, then a tariff reform in the sense of (20) increases
global welfare.
Proposition 1 can be seen as a generalization of Copeland (1994).18 The
difference of the present analysis to the one in Copeland (1994) is that here
the home country takes a global perspective (as it also receives utility from
the foreign country).19 Intuitively, Proposition 1 states that the source of in-
efficiency, given that international prices are fixed, is not the foreign country
but the home one. It is the production of the home country that the reform
should be accounting for, and not by how much the foreign country produce
and so pollute.
Though the result of Proposition 1 is, arguably, insightful it seems to be
rather restrictive as it is assumed that pollution taxes have been determined
under the assumption that tariff are zero. I now relax this assumption.
Suppose that optimal pollution taxes are set at their optimal first best level
and so—following (14)—at
s′ = eki′ − t′epki′ − t′rpsr−1ss . (22)
Making use now of the fact that r (p, s) is homogeneous of degree one in p
and s we have (following (14)) that20
eu (1− t′m) = t′eppdt . (23)
18For more detailed analysis on the effects of equiproportional distortions on welfare see
Dixit (1985) and, in a similar context, Baumol and Oates (1988).
19This, as briefly touched upon in the introductory section, relates to border tax adjust-
ments. It is the direction of the reform, and not of the determination of the actual tariff
that is the concern here.
20This implies that rppp+ rpss = 0 and rspp+ rsss = 0, and so rpsr
−1
ss rsp = rpp.
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Suppose now that tariffs change according to dt = −tda for some da > 0.(and
so uniformly). Then
eu (1− t′m) = −t′epptda > 0 , (24)
where the inequality follows from the fact that epp is a negative semi-definite
matrix.
Turning now to global welfare which, following from (16) and (23), is given
by
δdu+ ∆dU = (Eki
′rsp + t′epp) dt . (25)
the optimal tariff is given by
t′ (s) = −Eki′rspe−1pp , (26)
which upon close inspection—and in contrast to equation (18)—it reveals
that it is independent of the home country’s pollution distortion. This is
intuitive as the home country takes into account its own pollution distortion
by setting its pollution taxes optimally according to (22).
Consider now an equiproportional movement of tariffs towards their optimum
level, in the sense that
dt = − [t− t (s)] da , (27)
for a scalar da > 0. Global welfare can then be written as
δdu+ ∆dU = − [t− t (s)]′ epp [t− t (s)] da > 0 . (28)
We so have that:
Proposition 2 Starting from any arbitrary tariff distorted equilibrium, with
t 6= t (s), and assuming that pollution taxes are set at their first best optimal
level, then a home country’s tariff reform of the form of (27) is aggregate
welfare increasing. 21
21The home country’s tariff reform (27) can be Potential Pareto improving under the
additional assumption that rsp > 0 .
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4 Tariff reforms in the presence of coopera-
tive environmental policy
Suppose now that the home country, restricted by an environmental agree-
ment, is obligated to set its pollution taxes cooperatively maximizing the
aggregate welfare,22 given by
δdu+ ∆dU = [(eki
′ − t′epki′ − s′) rsp − t′λ] dt (29)
+ [(eki
′ − t′epki′ − s′) rss − t′rps] ds
+ Eki
′rspdt+ Eki′rssds ,
where δ ≡ eu (1− t′m) and ∆ ≡ EU . By setting its pollution taxes in
a cooperative fashion home country should take into account the sum of
damages eki+Eki, that a marginal emission causes in all countries, both to
itself and the other country. To see this set t = 0 and dt = 0 in (29) to obtain
eudu+ EUdU = [(eki
′ + Eki′ − s′) rss] ds , (30)
and so from the aggregate perspective optimal pollution taxes—given that
rss is (assumed to be) invertible— are given by s = eki+ Eki.
Second best optimal cooperative policy dictates that home country’s pollu-
tion taxes should be uniform within the country and equal to the aggregate
consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for pollution reduction. This recon-
firms the result of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014): Moving along the world’s
second best utility possibility frontier requires that the home country set its
pollution taxes in each sector so to equate the value of income loss that this
causes itself, given by s, to the sum of the damages eki+Eki, that a marginal
emission causes in all countries, both to itself and the other country.
Setting home country’s pollution taxes at their second best cooperative op-
timum level aggregate welfare becomes
δdu+ ∆dU = − [t′epki′rsp + t′λ] dt . (31)
22This can be justified by the UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated re-
sponsibility” ( United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; Principle 1
of Article 3). European countries, for instance, are committed to undertake mitigation
measures irrespective of action elsewhere (2020 climate & energy package, 2030 climate &
energy framework).
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Following from equation (31) the tariff that maximizes global welfare is
t′(s) = −t′epkrspλ−1. The fact that the optimal tariff is not accounting for
the foreign country’s pollution distortions is intuitive as the home country
sets its environmental taxes in a cooperative fashion it internalizes the exter-
nality and its effects on foreign country’s consumer.23 Rearranging the terms
of equation (31) we obtain
δdu+∆dU= [t′(s)− t′]λdt ,
where t′(s) = −t′epkrspλ−1. Considering now a uniform reform of tariffs such
that
dt = [t(s)− t] da, (33)
with da > 0. If the home country implements a reform of (33) global welfare
increases
δdu+ ∆dU = [t(s)− t] ′λ [t(s)− t] da ≥ 0. (34)
The inequality follows from the fact that λ is a positive semi-definite matrix
(and da > 0). To emphasize:
23Notice that the optimal tariffs from the home country’s perspective, setting its envi-
ronmental taxes cooperatively, are given by
eu(1− t´m)du = [(−Eki´− t´epki´)rsp − t´λ]dt, (32)
t´(s) = −(Eki´ + tepki´)rspλ-¹,
this is symmetrical to the cooperative second best optimal tariffs when the home country
sets its pollution taxes non-cooperative, equation (18). The difference between the two
lays on the sign of the effect of home country’s pollution distortion on foreign country
(Eki
′rspλ−1). This is due to the fact that by setting its pollution taxes cooperatively
home country takes into account the damages that a marginal emission causes to the
foreign country’s consumer.
Rearranging the terms of (32) home country’s welfare becomes
eu(1− t´m)du = [t (s)− t]′ λdt .
Considering now a tariffs reform that moves tariffs towards their Pareto efficient level
dt = [t(s)− t] da ,with da > 0— given that λ is a positive semi-definite matrix— home
country’s welfare increases
eu(1− t´m)du = [t (s)− t]′ λ [t(s)− t] da ≥ 0 .
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Proposition 3 Starting from any arbitrary tariff distorted equilibrium, with
pollution taxes set at their second best optimal cooperative level s = eki+Eki,
then a tariff reform in the sense of (33) is Pareto-improving.
Proposition 3 differs from proposition 1 as the home country’s tariff re-
form (33) does not take into account the home country pollution distor-
tions (Eki
′rspλ−1) that affect foreign country’s consumer. This is due to the
fact that heme country’s cooperative pollution taxes taken into account the
damages, Eki, that a marginal emission causes to the foreign country’s con-
sumer. Proposition 3 suggest that the reform should be accounting for the
home country’s pollution distortions to its own consumer and the tariff effect
on its own production and through that pollution.
Turning now to the search of tariff reforms with the environmental taxes set
at their first best cooperative level which, following from equation (29), are
given by
s´ = eki´ + Eki´− t´epki´− t´rpsrss-¹ . (35)
Equation (35) implies that the first best cooperative pollution taxes should
account not only for the damage that the marginal emission causes to the
home and foreign country’s consumer but also for the level of the imposed
tariff weighted by the effect of the marginal emission on compensated demand
(t´epk) as well as the changes on tariff revenues (t´rpsrss
-
¹) due to the effect
of the pollution taxes on production.
Setting now the pollution taxes at their first best cooperative level, it is
straight forward to verify that cooperatively free trade is optimum. Since
the home country can not affect international prices and so production ca-
pabilities of the foreign country and it takes into account the damage to
the foreign country’s consumer by setting its environmental taxes at their
cooperative first best optimal level.24
24Notice that the optimal non cooperative tariffs—setting pollution taxes to their opti-
mal first best cooperative level— are given by
eu(1− t′m)du = [(−Eki´ + t´rpsrss-¹) rsp − t′λ] dt ,
eu(1− t′m)du =
(−Eki´rspe−1pp + t´) e−1pp dt ,
t′(s) =Eki´rspe−1pp .
Optimality dictates that the non cooperative tariffs should account for the tariff effect
15
Aggregate welfare, following from (29) with pollution taxes set optimum, is
given by
δdu+ ∆dU = (t´rpsrss
-
¹rsp − t′λ) dt ,
which due to the fact that r (p, s) is homogeneous of degree one in p and s
becomes
δdu+ ∆dU = t′eppdt .
Since epp is a negative semi-definite matrix there exist increasing welfare tariff
reform that reduces the tariffs proportionate, dt = −tda for some da > 0.
Then
δdu+ ∆dU = −t′epptda ≥ 0 ,
Proposition 4 Starting from any arbitrary tariff distorted equilibrium, t 6=0,
and initial pollution taxes set at their first best optimal cooperative level , then
a tariff reform proportional to the initial tariffs level is Pareto-improving.
Proposition 4 generalizes the results of Copeland (1994) and Neary (2006)
taking into account the transboundary nature of pollution and considering
cooperative first best allocation of environmental taxes. Similar to the previ-
ous results proposition 4 suggests that the source of inefficiency is the home
thus the reform should account only for home country’s production.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the existence of, starting from any arbitrary
tariff distorted equilibrium, Pareto improving tariff reforms (of a particular
on home country’s emissions and so foreign country’s consumers weighted by their effect
on home country’s compensated demand. The sign of optimal tariffs depends on the
pollution intensity of home country’s production rsp, (for more detailed discussion on the
sign of rsp matrix see Neary (2006)). Considering now a tariff reform that moves tariffs
proportionally towards their optimum level, dt = [t(s)− t] da for some da > 0,—given
that epp is a negative semi-definite matrix—home country’s welfare increases
eu(1− t′m)du = − (t(s)− t)′ e−1pp (t(s)− t) da ≥ 0 .
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type). It has shown that within small open economies, and in the presence
of transboundary pollution, the source of inefficiency of the environmental
quality is driven only through the level of production of the home country.
It is this production that the home country’s tariff reform targets to reduce
and this is true in the presence of either cooperative or non cooperative,
first or second best, pollution taxes. This contradicts the underlying idea of
BTA’s that they are global welfare increasing due to the response—through
production reform—of the country with the weaker environmental regulation
(see Gros (2009) and Sanctuary (2013)). Since the country implementing the
BTA’s can not affect international prices the reform targets the production
of the home country which not only benefits the home country (by having
less emissions) but also benefits the foreign country through a reduction in
harmful emissions.
The limitations of the paper suggest avenues for future research. Interna-
tional prices have been kept fixed and as a consequence the home country
cannot influence foreign production abroad. It would be interesting to al-
low for the home country to be a large open economy (as in Turunen-Red
and Woodland. (2004) and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) and, therefore, be
able to influence the terms of trade (and the comparative advantage in the
production of goods) of the foreign country. This will be consistent with the
current rhetoric in favor of border tax adjustments.
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